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Abstract
The determination that sexual harassment constituted “discrimination based on sex” under Title VII was first made
by the lower federal courts, not Congress. Drawing from the literature on policy diffusion, this article examines the
adoption of hostile work environment standards across the U.S. Courts of Appeals in the absence of controlling
Supreme Court precedent. The results bolster recent findings about the influence of female judges on their male
colleagues and suggest that in addition to siding with female plaintiffs, female judges also helped to shape legal rules that
promoted gender equality in the workplace.
Keywords
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From the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibiting “discrimination on the basis of sex” to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson (477 U.S. 57(1986)), lower courts were left to create
and develop both the legal meaning of sex discrimination
and the standards by which sex discrimination cases
would be adjudicated. Scholars such as Catharine MacKinnon have observed that because of the lack of legislative
guidance on Title VII, it was the courts that truly shaped
the legal standards governing sex discrimination in the
workplace by responding to the reality of women’s experiences in discrimination lawsuits. This is not particularly
surprising: in the absence of clear guidance from the U.S.
Supreme Court, the circuits that make up the U.S. Courts
of Appeals are regularly left to the task of statutory interpretation and setting legal policy for their respective jurisdictions. But why did some circuits lead the way while
others were slower to develop doctrine? Was innovation
driven by internal factors or external ones?
Drawing from these questions, this article looks at the
evolving body of common law on sex discrimination that
developed in the U.S. Courts of Appeals prior to the U.S.
Supreme Court’s adoption of a controlling legal framework for evaluation of such claims under Title VII. While
the disputes that the circuits hear on appeal are decidedly
not representative of all claims, these cases are important
because they establish precedent for the whole circuit and
set forth a standard for lower courts to use in future
claims.

Specifically, we investigate the development of workplace sex discrimination doctrine during two periods of
uncertainty in the law. The first period of doctrinal evolution occurred in the federal appellate courts between
1964 and the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Meritor
Savings Bank v. Vinson, which formally expanded the
definition of sexual harassment to include “hostile work
environment” but left other legal questions unanswered.
The second period of interest includes cases decided after
Meritor but before the Supreme Court’s 1993 ruling in
Harris v. Forklift Systems (510 U.S. 17(1993)); this decision held that an abusive work environment does not have
to cause tangible injury in order for a victim to bring a
claim.
We proceed in the following fashion. First, we discuss
the concept of policy diffusion and how it operates in the
judicial context, and specifically in the U.S. Courts of
Appeals. We then explain how the role of the judiciary
differed in the area of sexual harassment compared to
other gender equality issues advocated by women’s rights
groups during the same time period. With this discussion
as a backdrop, we then set forth to test several hypotheses
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about the relevant institutional, legal, and environmental
factors that should influence a court’s adoption of the
legal rule that sexual harassment is discrimination based
on sex. We conclude by discussing what our findings tell
us about the circumstances that most favored the advancement of gender equality in the workplace. Central among
these is the presence of female judges on the appellate
bench.

Policy Diffusion in the Judicial
Context
Policy diffusion, or the process by which a policy innovation is disseminated to potential adopters, is welltraveled territory in studies of policymaking. Policy
innovations are simply new policy adoptions; the innovation represents the first time a particular agency, legislature, or government has adopted or implemented a
particular policy. That scholars have chosen to describe
the spread of policy innovations as “diffusion” implies
that governments or governmental units influence one
another to adopt the new policy (Shipan and Volden
2008). While most studies of policy diffusion are conducted at the state level and focus on a legislature’s decision to adopt a particular policy innovation, there exists
a substantial body of literature on the ways in which
policy innovations—defined more specifically as new
rules or doctrines—spread across court systems. Like
studies of legislative policy adoption, most studies of
judicial diffusion investigate the transmission of precedent across state court systems (Caldeira 1985; Canon
and Baum 1981; Lutz 1997; Savage 1985), although
scholars are increasingly interested in explaining the
same process at the federal appellate level (Klein 2002;
Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; Spill Solberg, Emrey,
and Haire 2006).
In general, theories of policy diffusion center around
three sets of determinants: internal, external, and policyspecific characteristics. Internal determinants include
such factors as institutional structures and characteristics,
public opinion, demographic factors, ideology (of both
government and the populace), and economic variables
(Dye 1966; Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993; Gray
1973; Jacoby and Schneider 2001; Squire 1993; Walker
1969). External factors typically taken into consideration
include the influence of regional neighbors, federal institutions, or historical events (Berry and Berry 1992; Karch
2004; Menzel and Feller 1997; Mooney 2001; Welch and
Thompson 1980). Finally, most diffusion models include
determinants specific to the policy innovation itself; for
instance, studies of innovation in criminal justice policy
might include measures of crime statistics specific to
each unit under observation.
Despite some findings that suggest judicial diffusion
differs significantly from the process for legislative

policy adoption and diffusion (e.g., Canon and Baum
1981; Lutz 1997; Savage 1985), there is evidence that the
general determinants and mechanisms of diffusion do
apply to the adoption of innovative doctrines across both
state and federal appellate courts. The institutional structures and characteristics of specific courts, along with a
well-developed system of judicial communication (via
the publication of written opinions), have been particularly cited as having a significant impact on the likelihood
that a court will adopt a legal innovation.

Determinants of Judicial Diffusion
Using the standard model of diffusion, judicial scholars
have investigated the adoption of precedent across state
supreme courts, finding that the diffusion of precedent is
inconsistent and does not conform to any standard pattern. Instead, judicial diffusion appears to depend largely
on internal determinants such as communication networks (e.g., legal reporting districts, citing doctrine in
written opinions), cultural similarities (i.e., shared demographic profiles), and institutional structures and characteristics (e.g., level of court professionalism, caseload,
and court prestige) of the courts in question (Caldeira
1985; Canon and Baum 1981; Kilwein and Brisbin 1997;
Lutz 1997; Savage 1985).
The idea that the adoption of a new doctrine or precedent is dependent upon internal determinants (and thus
appears to be idiosyncratic) is not wholly inconsistent
with the general findings in much of the diffusion literature. Recent findings by Volden (2006) suggest that
geographic proximity, the typical measure of regional
or neighborhood effects on policy diffusion, does not
necessarily lead to policy emulation. Instead, policy
diffusion is common across states that have similar
demographic, political, and fiscal profiles. Accordingly,
if judicial diffusion is indeed fairly idiosyncratic in
nature, then it is likely that the judicial diffusion process is significantly impacted not only by the institutional characteristics of courts but also by socioeconomic
variables and demands, which vary widely across
states, regions, and time periods. Thus, the particular
events of the time period under question, the needs of
the population at various moments in time, and the
characteristics of the very issue at question all should
have increased significance in the judicial diffusion
process.
Indeed, Canon and Baum (1981) suggest as much
when they note that pre- to postwar changes in population
size and urbanization had at least a minimal impact on the
diffusion of judicial innovations. In the same vein,
Kilwein and Brisbin (1997) also find that the characteristics of the question at hand, in addition to court characteristics, have an impact on the likelihood of adoption,
noting that courts are most likely to adopt rules that favor
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“have-nots,” or those who are disadvantaged, when they
are dominated by Democratic, relatively liberal judges.

Mechanisms of Diffusion
In addition to studying the determinants of policy adoption and diffusion, scholars have expanded their scope of
research to examine the mechanisms of diffusion. Studies
of state legislatures show that states are more likely to
adopt policies that have been successful in other states;
thus, it appears that states actively learn from the experiences of their peers, waiting to adopt a policy until they
are sure that policy will actually work (Shipan and
Volden 2008; Volden 2006). Extending this logic to judicial diffusion, researchers have documented a similar
mechanism at work. Emulation appears to take place
over the long term, as policy innovations and judicial
meaning evolve to become commonly accepted (Glick
1992, 1994; Glick and Hays 1991; Phillips and Grattet
2000; Volden 2006). The process by which appellate
courts develop the legal meaning of a concept in response
to increasingly accepted judicial rhetoric can then be
equated to policy learning (Phillips and Grattet 2000;
Shipan and Volden 2008).
Just as Volden (2006) suggests that simply having a
high proportion of adopting neighbors does not guarantee
that a state will adopt a policy innovation, regional influence does not appear to have a significant impact on the
likelihood that an innovation will be adopted by a given
court (Canon and Baum 1981). This is likely due to two
factors. First, the courts’ ability to adopt a precedent is
dependent upon opportunity, or the actual supply of cases
(Caldeira 1985; Canon and Baum 1981). No applicable
case on the docket? No adoption. Second, the idea of
regional neighborhood influence is too narrow for judicial diffusion; the legal system has well-established channels of communication that do not rely on geographical
proximity (Canon and Baum 1981; Lutz 1997). In fact, it
is this system of written opinions and legal reporting that
may be most responsible for the transmission of legal
doctrine.1 For example, all federal appellate opinions designated for publication are included in the Federal
Reporters (rather than being separated out into regional
publications), so a panel of judges from the First Circuit
arguably has easy access to the legal rules established by
the Fifth Circuit. Additionally, the hierarchical arrangement of courts within the federal system works to structure the patterns of diffusion. Courts that are lower in the
hierarchy (e.g., trial courts, intermediate appellate courts)
are bound by precedents established by their courts of last
resort, and on matters of federal law, state courts are
bound by federal court pronouncements. In the federal
judiciary, the intermediate appellate courts are organized
into regionally based “circuits”; each circuit cultivates its

own body of precedent and, in the absence of Supreme
Court guidance, can emulate or ignore other circuits’
legal innovations as it sees fit.
One might also expect that judicial diffusion may be
slower than diffusion across legislatures or administrative
institutions. There may be several reasons for this. First,
judicial diffusion may be hampered by relative autonomy
of courts (Kilwein and Brisbin 1997). This makes diffusion most likely when a court has the institutional capacity
to “receive, adapt, and implement the message about the
establishment of a doctrine” (Kilwein and Brisbin 1997,
132). Indeed, even those scholars who argue that there are
no defined patterns of judicial diffusion emphasize the
importance of communication between courts in the transmission of legal precedent (Caldeira 1985; Comparato
2002; Savage 1985). For example, Caldeira (1985) finds
that courts are more likely to adopt a precedent from their
peers when the two courts exist within the same regional
communication channel (i.e., distance and legal reporting
district). Consequently, it is likely that judicial diffusion is
facilitated by policy learning, especially given the propensity of courts to cite the decisions of other courts and
judges as a way to justify their own decisions (Shapiro
1970, 51; Spill Solberg, Emrey, and Haire 2006; Shipan
and Volden 2008).

Diffusion across the
U.S. Courts of Appeals
While most judicial diffusion studies involve the spread
of doctrine and precedent across state court systems,
Klein (2002) and Spill Solberg, Emrey, and Haire (2006)
investigate the Courts of Appeals’ reactions to areas of
law in which they do not have clear Supreme Court direction. In general, Klein (2002) argues that judges at the
appellate level do not make decisions about adoption of
a particular doctrine based on concerns about or anticipation of possible Supreme Court reaction; instead, judges
are influenced by a number of other considerations,
including their own ideological proximity to the rule
under consideration as well as the legal prestige and
expertise of the judge who originally authored the doctrine under consideration. Like Klein (2002), Spill
Solberg, Emrey, and Haire (2006) find that circuits are
more likely to adopt those new doctrines that were developed by circuits perceived to have policy expertise; this
indicates that circuits cite those courts that frequently
publish opinions in particular policy areas, or at least
those who are willing to be first adopters (see also Walsh
1997). However, they also note that circuits are likely to
rely on their own legal capital when possible (Spill
Solberg, Emrey, and Haire 2006, 286). These findings are
consistent with those studies that note the importance of
institutional characteristics in judicial diffusion (Caldeira
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1985; Canon and Baum 1981). They also echo Shipan
and Volden’s (2008) finding that smaller, less experienced governmental institutions are more likely to adopt
policy innovations in imitation of larger, more experienced institutions.
Klein (2002) also discusses the importance of widespread circuit acceptance of a rule; he finds that increased
circuit support for a given rule heightens the probability
that subsequent judges will adopt. This finding is underscored by another conclusion: that judges are less likely
to adopt the doctrine in question when a previous ruling
includes a dissent (Klein 2002). Taken together, the
impact of widespread circuit acceptance and presence of
a dissenting opinion indicate the judges want to be sure of
the “success” (in this case, defined as legal viability or
“settled” meaning) of a new rule (see also Phillips and
Grattet 2000). Again, this mirrors the legislative diffusion
process, as governments are more likely to adopt an innovation that has already proven to be successful at some
level (Volden 2006).
Similarly, Spill Solberg, Emrey, and Haire (2006) find
that judges on the Courts of Appeals do seem to be influenced by the decisions and opinions of other circuits.
However, this effect happens over time; early in the process of developing a new area of law, judges are more reliant on the characteristics of their own circuits. This finding
provides support for the idea that judicial diffusion is a
slow process that is driven by policy learning: judges wait
to adopt an innovative rule or doctrine until they are
assured of its success and support across other circuits
(Klein 2002; Phillips and Grattet 2000; Volden 2006). The
authors also note that circuits are more likely to cite outside opinions when making decisions in cases involving
particularly difficult issues (Spill Solberg, Emrey, and
Haire 2006). The logic is simple: in such cases the circuit
majority is seeking additional justification to enhance the
legitimacy of its opinion (see also Walsh 1997).
Finally, because previous research has found that the
adoption of legal rules is subject to the nature of the policy area, we turn our attention to the larger context of the
women’s movement and the degree to which fighting
sexual harassment was connected to this movement’s
policy goals.

Gender Equality, Sexual
Harassment, and the Courts
Unlike other types of sex discrimination claims (e.g.,
equal pay, support for working mothers, fairness in hiring
and promotion), sexual harassment did not start out as an
issue championed by the women’s rights movement. In
her essay “The Logic of Experience” (reprinted in her
2007 edited volume), Catharine MacKinnon observes,
“Social movements did not first define the issue of sexual

harassment in the public mind to the degree that the
courts did” (p. 165). Instead, sexual harassment became
a cognizable legal claim through the uncoordinated decisions of individual women who believed that their
employment should not be conditioned on their performance of sexual favors (quid pro quo harassment) or
their acquiescence to pervasive verbal, physical, and
psychological abuse (hostile environment harassment).
These decisions exemplify the way in which legal mobilization can infuse private litigation with political significance (Jacob 1969).
Visible and audible, as an injured party, someone with
relevant information, a woman could, at the least,
make a man look bad, perhaps cost him a great
deal. . . . With women no longer absorbing the entire
cost of this conduct in private, sexual politics went
public, shifting the ground of political convention
and becoming a visible part of politics as
usual. . . . Fundamentally, sexual harassment law
transformed what was a moral foible (if that) into a
legal injury to equality rights. (MacKinnon 2007, 185)
This perspective on the courts’ contribution to gender
equality in the workplace views judicial creativity in a
positive light, heralding the advantages of “bottom-up”
policy development by courts as opposed to “top-down”
policymaking by legislative bodies. In particular,
MacKinnon argues that features of the common law decision-making process—extrapolating broader principles
from a set of facts and applying them to similar facts—
was helpful to women in this case. Rather than being
defined in the abstract by a legislative body or an advocacy group, legal recognition of sexual harassment as discrimination came about in an incremental process shaped
by women’s lived experiences with discrimination.
While MacKinnon (2007) heralds the role of the courts
in addressing the social and legal implications of sexual
harassment, other scholars argue that the courts were only
allowed to act because of social and political developments occurring outside the judiciary. In these accounts,
the process by which the courts addressed sexual harassment was a culmination of multiple events that were brewing in the political and institutional environments well
before the first official judicial recognition of the problem.
For example, Zippel (2006) provides a narrative of the
evolution of sexual harassment policy in the United States,
noting that the courts were spurred to action by the convergence of two key events: the social mobilization of the
second-wave women’s movement, including the conscious decision to address the growing problem of “sexual
harassment” and the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission’s (EEOC’s) decision to file an amicus brief
in support of a plaintiff claiming sex-based discrimination
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(Corne v. Bausch & Lomb 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Arizona),
1975)). Others have argued that because the courts developed sexual harassment precedent in response to social
and political activity, this created a restrictive definition of
sexual harassment, a narrow definition that focuses too
much on sexual abuse as popularly understood and not
enough on harassment based on gender discrimination and
mistreatment (Schultz 1998).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission also
played a role in the conceptualization of sexual harassment as a violation of workplace anti-discrimination policies. In particular, the EEOC’s contribution to legal
innovation primarily occurred through its activities as a
rule-making body and through its decisions to file amicus
curiae briefs in federal court.2 With respect to rulemaking,
in 1980, the EEOC (under the direction of Eleanor Holmes
Norton) issued its first set of guidelines describing sexual
harassment as a type of discrimination based on sex prohibited by Title VII. In these guidelines, the EEOC noted
that “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual
nature” all constituted sexual harassment, whether they
were directly connected to quid pro quo harassment or
with harassment that had “the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance,” thereby “creating an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive working environment” (29 CFR 1604.11(a)).
The Supreme Court explicitly drew upon this language in
Meritor v. Vinson, though it rejected the EEOC’s proposed
scheme of employer liability as raised in their amicus brief
(Anderson 1987). The EEOC also filed amicus briefs in
early cases such as Bundy v. Jackson (641 F.2d 934 (D.C.
Cir. 1981)) and Henson v. City of Dundee (682 F.2d 897
(11th Cir. 1982)) and intervened on behalf of the plaintiffs
in a Ninth Circuit hostile environment case, EEOC v.
Hacienda Hotel (881 F.2d 1504 (9th Cir. 1989)).
Of course, legal developments in sexual harassment
doctrine would likely not have happened without judges
who were willing to innovate in the absence of legal guidance from the Supreme Court or Congress, attorneys who
were willing to push the envelope with novel legal arguments, and plaintiffs who understood their treatment at
work as an injury deserving of legal redress and were willing to take on the various costs of litigation.3 Discusses the
obstacles that early plaintiffs had to surmount even after
they decided they wanted to litigate. Central among these
was finding attorneys willing to argue for an expanded
definition of sex discrimination law, since the plaintiffs
were not “repeat players” in the litigation process
(Galanter 1974).4
In sum, by naming and recognizing the problems faced
by women in the workplace (problems that were not
being adequately addressed by existing employment discrimination laws), these plaintiffs, attorneys, and judges

served as “critical actors” for the larger cause of gender
equality, even if their efforts were not coordinated. Childs
and Krook (2006, 528) define critical actors as “those
who initiate policy proposals on their own . . . and
embolden others to take steps to promote policies for
women.” Because of the important role that precedent
plays in a common law system, the significance of the
first few appellate cases to recognize sexual harassment
went beyond victory for the plaintiffs involved. As favorable precedent began to emerge in a few circuits, judges
in other circuits had more “legal capital”5 available to
them when facing these novel claims themselves. While
appellate judges are not bound by precedent from circuits
other than their own, they often look to other courts’
examples when their circuit has not established a clear
rule (Klein 2002).

Theoretical Framework
Given the reactive, not proactive, nature of the judicial
institution, we argue that both internal and external factors affected the timing of each circuit’s first decision
interpreting Title VII to prohibit hostile work environment sexual harassment. These initial decisions are
important, not because they represent all of the sexual
harassment claims filed in court (they do not), but
because they established circuit-wide precedent in the
absence of any Supreme Court precedent on sexual
harassment.6 The literature suggests three sets of explanations for policy adoption that can be broadly classified
as legal, institutional, and environmental in nature.

Legal Factors
Miller and Sarat (1980-1981, 544) describe the dispute
resolution pyramid as having several stages, with smaller
numbers at each subsequent level: injury, grievance,
claim, dispute, resort to lawyers, and filing. For a case to
appear before a circuit court, we add another step to the
process: an appeal. Prior to the passage of Title VII, there
were almost certainly many “injuries” in the form of
sexual harassment in the workplace, but as the concept of
“sexual harassment” per se was not understood as such
(MacKinnon 2007). However, once legislation that
banned “discrimination based on sex” was in place, this
provided legal grounds for women to articulate a grievance: they were being treated unfairly by their employers
because of their sex.
Thus, the opportunity for federal appeals courts to rule
on sexual harassment is, first, dependent upon the presence of relevant disputes. We conceptualize this “opportunity” as including the time elapsed after the passage of
Title VII.7 This allows time both for cases to make their
way through the court system and for circuits to seek out
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signals from other courts prior to adopting a new rule
(Klein 2002; Phillips and Grattet 2000; Volden 2006). In
addition, the presence of available “legal capital” (Spill
Solberg, Emrey, and Haire 2006), such as existing circuit
precedent or other circuits’ precedent, may explain the
timing of a court’s decision. One potential source of precedent available to courts is the existing precedent interpreting Title VII as prohibiting “racial harassment” as
part of “discrimination based on race.” These cases first
explicated the concept of an “abusive” or “hostile” environment, language later picked up in the sexual harassment cases, detailing how constant slurs, taunting, and
the like constituted “discrimination based on race.”
Because judges engage in analogical reasoning as they
search for relevant legal authorities to guide their decisions (Sunstein 1993), similarities between a racially and
sexually hostile environment might inform a court’s decision to recognize a hostile work environment in the sexual harassment context.8
Likewise, if a court had previously ruled on a quid pro
quo sexual harassment case, this would be a source of
“in-house” legal capital available to help formulate a new
rule on hostile environment discrimination (and would
allow for a relatively smaller, more incremental shift in
policy). In addition to looking to other circuits, the participation of organized interests via amicus curiae briefs
can provide legal arguments as well as ideological cues
that hasten adoption (Martinek 2006). Finally, because of
the structure of the federal judicial hierarchy, it should be
expected that relevant stare decisis from the Supreme
Court should hasten a circuit’s adoption of a legal rule.
Two Supreme Court decisions on sexual harassment were
handed down between 1965 and 1994: Meritor Savings v.
Vinson (1986) and Harris v. Forklift Systems (1993). It
should be noted that Meritor was not dispositive on the
issue of sexual harassment, as it left open several important issues that were later clarified by Harris. For this reason, we include cases decided both before and after
Meritor, though we expect that circuits will be more
likely to adopt the hostile environment standard after
Meritor was handed down in 1986.

Institutional Factors
In addition to legal factors, a substantial body of research
has acknowledged the importance of the institutional
context in shaping circuit court outcomes, particularly
panel- and circuit-level influences (e.g., Cohen 2002;
Hettinger, Lindquist, and Martinek 2006). Of these, the
ideological preferences of the court have been identified
as having a substantial effect (Kastellec 2007; Tiller and
Cross 1999). We expect that the preferences of the circuit, as measured by its median ideology, will affect
when a court will adopt a hostile environment rule.

Likewise, we expect that the preferences of the panel
hearing the case will be related to adoption, with more
liberal panels being more likely to adopt than more conservative panels (Kilwein and Brisbin 1997).9
The timing of adoption may also be driven by the
Courts of Appeals’ status as an intermediate appellate
court under the Supreme Court’s direction. It is possible
that a circuit may be responding to recent oversight and
correction by the Supreme Court, in the form of reversals.
While the degree to which the Supreme Court acts as an
effective principal is quite limited due to the small fraction of cases it accepts each year (Lindquist, Haire, and
Songer 2007), a circuit might be less likely to innovate if
it had recently sustained a number of reversals.
Additionally, innovation might be affected by the degree
to which the circuit and the Supreme Court are ideologically congruent, with circuits more willing to take “risks”
when conditions at the Supreme Court appear favorable
(but see Klein 2002).
Finally, the likelihood of circuit adoption of a hostile
environment rule may be influenced by the presence of
a female judge. A growing body of empirical research
on the U.S. Courts of Appeals supports this expectation
in employment discrimination cases. Peresie (2005)
finds that in cases involving claims of sexual harassment or sex discrimination, plaintiffs double their
chances of a favorable decision when the panel includes
a female judge. Songer, Davis, and Haire (1994) note
that women judges make relatively more liberal decisions when it comes to claims of employment discrimination. Finally, Boyd, Epstein, and Martin (2010) find
that women judges have both an individual and panel
impact when it comes to judging sex discrimination
cases; specifically, male judges who serve with a woman
on a panel in such cases are more likely to rule in favor
of the plaintiff.10 Following this literature, we expect
that the presence of a female judge should increase the
likelihood that a court will adopt a hostile environment
standard.

Environmental Factors
The remaining set of factors that are likely to affect the
timing of innovation can be found not in the law or in the
federal judiciary, but in the environments in which the
circuits are situated. Regional characteristics of the circuit, such as the proportion of women in the workforce,
citizen liberalism, and litigiousness, may affect both the
“supply” of lawsuits and the willingness of judges to
respond with a new legal standard. The public awareness
of sexual harassment arguably increased greatly after
1991, due to the volume of news coverage of the
Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings and the Tailhook
scandal. However, these events do not affect our analysis
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because the last circuit to adopt a hostile environment
interpretation did so in 1989.

Research Design
In this article, we are seeking to explain innovations by
the U.S. Courts of Appeals in the absence of controlling
Supreme Court precedent on sexual harassment law.
Specifically, we look at each time a circuit explicitly
noted that “discrimination based on sex” included the
creation of a sexually hostile or abusive work environment (“first adoptions”).11 We also examine subsequent
clarifications of the standard in cases that followed first
adoption cases. We allow for multiple “adoptions” by a
circuit because fact patterns vary across cases and courts
are constrained by the cases brought to them. For example, after the first time a circuit recognized hostile environment harassment, subsequent decisions might clarify
questions about liability, the severity of harassment
needed for an actionable claim, and the vantage point
from which objectionable behavior is assessed.
In terms of the opportunity to make policy, we identify
two “windows” in which these decisions occurred. The
first window exists after the passage of Title VII in 1965
and before the Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Meritor
Savings v. Vinson. In Meritor, the Court ruled that Title
VII was not limited to sex discrimination of an “economic
character,” that the correct standard for review was
whether the behavior was “unwelcome,” and that trial
courts should consider the “totality of the circumstances”
rather than evaluating each incident in isolation. Prior to
1986, five circuits had adopted a hostile environment rule.
The second window spans the time between Meritor
and the Supreme Court’s second sexual harassment case,
Harris v. Forklift Systems (1993). Harris clarified the reference point for determining whether behavior was offensive (the “reasonable person” standard)12 and emphasized
that to have an actionable claim, plaintiffs must show that
the conduct was “more than a mere utterance” while not
requiring the conduct to cause a “nervous breakdown.”
Between Meritor and Harris, the remainder of the circuits adopted the policy, with the last court (the Ninth
Circuit) adopting in 1989.
To explain the timing of each circuit’s adoption of the
hostile environment interpretation of Title VII, we utilize
a Cox proportional hazards model. Duration analysis is
particularly useful for the study of policy innovation and
diffusion, as the main line of inquiry involves speculation
on both the circumstances that contribute to policy adoption and the timing of individual adoptions. Duration
models account for the possibility that individual subjects
observed in multiple time periods might “fail” by succumbing to some event (in this case, adopting a standard
for the adjudication of sexual harassment claims).13

Among the survival time methods, the Cox proportional
hazards model is used here because it requires no assumption regarding the model distribution, which comports
well with diffusion theory (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones
1997; Gray 1973; Rogers 1962).14 Because our data
include multiple adoptions by individual circuits, we estimate a multiple events Cox model; this allows for the fact
that a given circuit experienced the same event (i.e.,
adoption of a standard) more than once during the time
period under question. The variance corrected model utilizes robust standard errors with observations clustered
by circuit; the data are stratified by event, or the order in
which adoptions occurred.15

Dependent Variable
We conceptualize our dependent variable as each time a
circuit adopted, clarified, or expanded a hostile environment standard in a case. To identify the instances in
which a circuit adopted or expanded the hostile environment standard, we generated a list of cases via the
Westlaw database, using the search terms sexual harassment, Title VII, and hostile environment.16 This produced
the universe of published opinions for the eleven numbered circuits and the District of Columbia; from these,
trained coders content analyzed all sexual harassment
cases decided by each circuit between 1965 and 1993. A
case was designated as an “adoption” (coded as a 1)
based on explicit language in the majority opinion stating
that the court was expanding the definition of sex discrimination to include a hostile or abusive work environment or that it was clarifying its hostile environment rule.

Independent Variables
To account for the role of institutional factors in explaining policy adoption, we included several variables related
to the court’s policy preferences and decision-making
tendencies. As a measure of circuit ideological preferences, we used the circuit median ideology variable from
the Judicial Common Space scores (Epstein et al. 2007).
These scores are calculated based on the NOMINATE
Common Space scores (Poole 1998; Poole and Rosenthal
1997) and range from –1 (most liberal) to +1 (most conservative). In this issue area, more liberal circuits should
have a greater likelihood of adoption compared to conservative courts because of their policy preferences related to
women’s rights. Another variable captures aspects of
policy preferences at the panel level. The panel ideology
variable is the median of the Judicial Common Space
scores for the three members of the panel hearing the
case. As with circuit preferences variable, if a majority of
the panel holds relatively liberal policy preferences, we
should expect them to be more likely than a conservative
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panel to expand the definition of sex discrimination to
include hostile environment harassment. Third, because
previous work has found that the degree of ideological
cohesion within a court influences the extent to which a
panel will cite caselaw from another circuit (Spill Solberg,
Emrey, and Haire 2006), we also included a lagged estimate of circuit dissensus that is a moving three-year average of the dissent rate in each circuit.17
Additionally, the presence of female judges as “critical
actors” who help promote an understanding of sex discrimination (Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010) might hasten the adoption of a hostile environment rule. We test
this expectation with a dummy variable that indicates
whether there was a woman judge serving on the panel
hearing the case (coded 1 if there was at least one woman
and 0 if there were no women).18
Within the judicial hierarchy, the relationship between
a given circuit and the Supreme Court might also influence a panel’s decision about whether and when to innovate. To account for this relationship, we include variables
that tap into the degree of oversight a circuit has received
and also the degree to which a circuit shares the policy
preferences of the Supreme Court. For the former variable, we calculated a lagged reversal rate using the Spaeth
Supreme Court data set, using the raw number of reversals in the previous year divided by the total number of
terminations on the merits.19 To account for ideological
congruence (or lack thereof) between a circuit and the
Supreme Court, we calculated the distance between the
Supreme Court and the circuit median using the Judicial
Common Space scores, then took the absolute value.
Several variables related to environmental explanations for diffusion were obtained from the U.S. census.
As a rough indicator of the “opportunity” for sexual
harassment lawsuits, we calculated the proportion of
women in the civilian workforce for each circuit. While a
yearly figure would be more sensitive to changes in
workforce demographics, these data are only available in
the census reports, so we used the 1970 data for 19651970, the 1980 data for 1971-1980, the 1990 data for
1981-1990, and the 2000 data for 1991-1993. Additionally,
to account for the relative levels of litigiousness within
each circuit, we utilize the population density averaged
across all states in the circuit.20 Previous scholarship has
found that greater levels of social complexity are related
to more litigation (Yates, Davis, and Glick 2001;
Harrington and Ward 1995). We also control for the possibility that citizen ideology influences the relative litigiousness of a circuit by including the Berry et al. (1998)
measure of citizen liberalism, which ranges from 0 (conservative) to 100 (liberal).
The legal capital variables were coded directly from
the cases and Westlaw search results. The number of previous appellate sexual harassment cases was summed to

provide a “count” of available legal capital across all circuits. To account for intracircuit legal capital, we also
included a dummy variable equal to 1 if the circuit had
previously acknowledged quid pro quo harassment as a
violation of Title VII. The use of racial harassment precedents was coded as a 1 if the court cited such a case in
any way and a 0 if not. Finally, drawing from the literature on “policy entrepreneurs” as well as recent findings
on the influence of amicus curiae briefs (Collins 2007),
we control for the presence of an amicus brief as a proxy
for the participation of a policy entrepreneur (Martinek
2006).21 For example, discussions of sexual harassment
law often mention interventions by attorneys representing women’s rights groups, such as Nadine Taub of
Rutgers’ Women’s Rights Litigation or the EEOC.

Analysis
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission began
collecting data on Title VII sexual harassment charges in
1990.22 Unfortunately, these data were not collected by
the EEOC throughout the entire period of our study and
as such, cannot be included in our multivariate analysis,
but they do provide us some insight on variation in the
number of reported incidences of sexual harassment in the
workplace. “Charges” refers to reports filed with the
EEOC and does not reflect whether the EEOC determined
that there was reasonable cause or whether the claim was
ultimately successful. Rather, we consider “charges” as an
indicator of awareness of sexual harassment and as a necessary but not sufficient condition for a grievance to
become a lawsuit (Miller and Sarat 1980-1981).
In the period between 1990 and 1994, there is a sizeable jump across all states after the year of the Thomas
confirmation hearings and the Tailhook scandal in 1991;
the average number of charges increases from 65 in 1990
to 110 in 1992. The rising trend then continues in subsequent years. Across circuits, after adjusting for population size, the District of Columbia circuit has the highest
average number of charges during this time period, followed by two of the southern circuits (the Fifth and the
Eleventh). At the lower end of the range, the Ninth and
the First circuits, respectively, have .06 and .02 charges
per 1,000 residents. The number of charges is moderately
and positively correlated with the population of a state
(r =.72) and the number of women in the civilian workforce (r = .54), so we can be reasonably confident that
even without a direct measure of the number of charges,
including these two variables allows us to tap into the
“supply” side of litigation. (See the appendix for tables
detailing this information at http://prq.sagepub.com/
supplemental/.)
Turning next to the adoptions data, across circuits, no
regional trends appear to explain the order in which

Downloaded from prq.sagepub.com at LOUISIANA STATE UNIV on May 9, 2012

9

Moyer and Tankersley
adoption occurred. 23 There were a total of fifty-six published cases where adoptions occurred during this time
period. The Seventh Circuit (comprising Illinois,
Wisconsin, and Indiana) led the way with twelve cases,
about two standard deviations above the mean (6.8),
while the First Circuit (Maine, New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, and Rhode Island) and the Third Circuit
(Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware) tied for the
fewest number of cases (two). Women were the plaintiffs
alleging sexual harassment in all of the cases included in
our study. A little over half of the cases (54 percent, or
thirty cases) yielded outcomes that were clearly favorable
to the female plaintiff. In addition, 8.9 percent of cases
(five) yielded mixed outcomes, meaning that the female
plaintiff won on at least some of her claims. The remaining 38 percent of cases were resolved in favor of the
employer. This tells us that while a court’s adoption was
not uniformly beneficial for the women bringing their
claims to court, in about two-thirds of the cases, most
female plaintiffs were at least somewhat successful.
The results of the Cox proportional hazards model are
displayed in Table 1. Because there was not enough variance to analyze the first time window of 1965-1986 separately, the results shown in the first column include the
years of 1965 to 1993, along with a dummy variable to
flag cases decided after Meritor v. Vinson. The results
shown in the second column reflect only post-Meritor
cases through 1993.24 Throughout the entire period (and
in both models), institutional and legal factors had the
greatest and most significant impact on a circuit’s decision to adopt the hostile or abusive work environment
standard. Only one of the variables representing environmental factors achieved statistical significance: citizen
ideology. Contrary to expectations, circuits located in
more conservative regions were approximately 4 percent
to 6 percent more likely to adopt the hostile environment
standard than other circuits. Neither of the other variables
that captured the “supply” side of litigation (women in
the labor force and population density) was statistically
significant, though this is likely due to the lack of variance in the census measures.
With regard to institutional factors during the 19641993 period, characteristics of the panel hearing the case
emerged as more influential than characteristics related to
the court as a whole. While circuit ideology had no effect,
panels comprised of more liberal judges were more likely
to adopt the hostile environment standard. This is consistent with earlier work that finds that liberal judges are
more likely to adopt legal standards that favor disadvantaged parties (Kilwein and Brisbin 1997). Interestingly,
the gender composition of the panel yielded a much larger
substantive impact on adoption, even after controlling for
ideology; panels were three times more likely to adopt a
hostile environment rule when a female judge was present

compared to cases heard by only male judges. This measure has the second largest effect of any independent variable in the model, including Supreme Court precedent.
Looking at the variables that tap into the dynamics of
innovation within a judicial hierarchy, it appears that circuits were making legal policy without being constrained
by concerns about sanctioning from the Supreme Court.
When cases from both the pre- and post-Meritor periods
are included, we see that reversals were not significant
predictors of adoption; moreover, in the post-Meritor
model, a circuit’s reversal rate was negatively related to
adoption of the hostile environment standard. In both
models, greater ideological distance from the Supreme
Court actually increased the likelihood of adoption—a
finding inconsistent with the argument that ideologically
“extreme” circuits curbed their innovations out of concerns that the Supreme Court would alter their preferred
rule. Taken together, it appears that the intermediate
appellate courts were only minimally responsive to the
threat of reversal, and then only after the Supreme Court
had provided some indication of its preferences on the
issue of sexual harassment. The final circuit-level control
variable, workload, was significantly related to adoption
in both models (hazard ratio = .99). Circuits that led the
way in adoption tended to be those with a slightly smaller
caseload, perhaps because they had more available time
to spend on innovations.
The availability of legal capital from other circuits
emerged as the most important legal factor to influence
adoption in both models. As expected, the citation of sexual harassment precedent from other circuits increased
the likelihood of adoption of the hostile or abusive work
environment standard; circuits that cited existing sexual
harassment precedent from other courts were nearly three
times more likely to adopt their own rule. While panels
are not bound by the decisions of other circuits, the citation of these other rulings provides support for a policy
learning account of diffusion, namely, that panels legitimized their decisions by pointing to “successful” doctrinal innovations in other jurisdictions. In contrast, there
was not evidence of widespread reliance on racial harassment doctrine; citations to these analogous cases were
limited to just a few opinions. Contrary to our expectations, the existence of intracircuit precedent on quid pro
quo harassment had a small, negative effect on adoption
and clarification of the hostile environment standard, but
only in the post-Meritor period. While we can only speculate as to why this happened, courts were consistently
willing to rely on out-of-circuit precedent when they
adopted or clarified the hostile environment rule throughout the entirety of the period studied; perhaps after
Meritor, there were simply fewer appeals in circuits that
had already recognized one type of sexual harassment
(i.e., quid pro quo). The amicus variable also failed to
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Table 1. Factors Influencing Adoption of Standards for Sexual Harassment Cases: Cox Proportional Hazards Models
Model 1 (1965-1993)
Variable

Coefficient

Circuit ideology
Ideological distance from Supreme Court
Lagged reversal rate
Population density in circuit
Percentage 2omen in workforce (circuit)
Citizen ideology of circuit
Sexual harassment precedent from other circuits
Circuit previously adopted quid pro quo standard
Cites racial harassment precedent
Amicus brief
Female judge on panel
Panel ideology
Circuit workload
Lagged dissent rate
Meritor v.Vinson
Log pseudo-likelihood

−1.47
2.23***
−5.41
0.00
−3.55
−0.03**
0.86**
−0.68
−0.12
0.38
1.23***
−3.61***
−0.02**
7.66
35.34**
–88.47

RSE
1.31
0.70
6.93
0.00
5.37
0.01
0.37
0.52
0.44
0.37
0.46
1.14
0.006
4.69
16.30

Model 2 (1987-1993)

Hazard ratio Coefficient
0.23
9.33
0.00
1.00
0.03
0.97
2.37
0.51
0.89
1.46
3.41
0.027
0.985
3153
0.00

Circuits = 12
Total observations = 348
Failures = 56

−2.16
2.23**
−15.60*
−0.00
−7.57*
−0.06***
0.91***
−1.93***
0.29
0.52
1.39**
−5.47***
−0.02*
9.81
−–
–67.87

RSE

Hazard ratio

1.49
1.13
9.02
0.00
5.29
0.02
0.39
0.63
0.71
0.53
0.57
1.20
0.01
8.17

0.115
9.28
0
0.10
0.00
0.94
2.48
0.14
1.33
1.68
4.02
0.00
0.98
18,27
—

Circuits = 12
Total observations = 84
Failures = 42

Results of a Cox proportional hazard model with time-varying covariates, using the Breslow method for ties. Hazard ratios greater than one
indicate a positive relationship; hazard ratios less than one indicate a negative relationship.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.

achieve statistical significance, underscoring the significance of legal arguments raised by plaintiffs’ attorneys
rather than a well-organized and -financed concerted
effort by women’s rights groups as third parties.25
After the Supreme Court’s first sexual harassment ruling in Meritor v. Vinson, we see a statistically significant
but substantively negligible effect on the likelihood of
adoption. The coefficient tells us that this is a negative
effect, but the size of the effect is quite small. This is also
fairly common in studies of policy diffusion, as a period
of early innovation is followed by a surge in adoption that
marginally recedes as individual adopters pause to evaluate and review the changing policy landscape (Glick and
Hays 1991; Walker 1969).

Discussion
In this analysis, we hypothesized that the timing of circuit adoption of a hostile environment standard would be
contingent on institutional, legal, and environmental factors. Of these, internal determinants related to institutional and legal variables were the strongest explanatory
factors, underscoring the utility of an integrated model of
appellate court decision making (Songer and Haire
1992). Panel ideology was a driving force for adoption,
and throughout the entire time period, ideologically dis-

tant courts were more likely to adopt or clarify their
standards. These findings suggest that courts were not
anticipating or responding to the Supreme Court’s preferences in the timing of their decisions, but rather were
following their own preferences. This is not altogether
surprising, given the limited ability (and willingness) of
the Supreme Court to monitor the lower courts on all
developing legal issues. Klein (2002, 126) observed,
from his interviews with circuit court judges, “the
Supreme Court’s potential actions may sometimes enter
into circuit judges’ thinking but are not a major influence
on their decisions.” His interpretation is consistent with
our findings here. The significance of ideological impact
in our model is also consistent with previous literature
(Kilwein and Brisbin 1997) suggesting that judges with
more liberal policy preferences are more likely to issue
rulings that favor groups that traditionally have been
victims of discrimination.
In addition to the ideological composition of the panel,
the gender composition of the panel was strongly associated with the adoption of the hostile environment standard.
Adoption was three times more likely when a panel contained a woman—a striking result given the paucity of the
women on the bench during this time period (1965-1993).
Two perspectives from the literature provide insight on this
result. First, scholars in the substantive representation
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literature have argued that rather than focusing on the raw
numbers or proportion of women in political institutions,
we should instead focus on “critical actors” who were
instrumental in promoting policies that are beneficial for
women (Childs and Krook 2006). Here, we see evidence
that female judges in the 1970s and 1980s were behaving
as “critical actors,” at least in terms of sexual harassment
law. This should not be surprising, given that the few
women who were federal judges during this era likely
faced hostility or isolation as trailblazers in their profession. For example, both Sandra Day O’Connor and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg have described numerous personal experiences with gender discrimination in their legal careers during this same time period (Bazelon 2007). Of course, we
should be cautious in generalizing about the effect of
female judges to other time periods, as the female composition of the federal bench likely reflects the appointment
goals of particular presidents and may not necessarily
translate to pro-woman outcomes in other areas of the law.
Second, recent research on the U.S. Courts of Appeals
has documented significant differences in outcomes
between mixed-gender panels and all-male panels in
cases involving sex discrimination (for a review of the
literature see Boyd, Epstein, and Martin 2010). Even after
controlling for ideology, we find that the presence of
female judges exerts a liberalizing tendency on male
judges in terms of support for plaintiffs. However, our
findings go beyond previous work; here, female judges
are associated with the creation of a legal rule favorable
to women, not just casting a pro-plaintiff vote. Although
we do not fully understand the causal mechanism behind
this effect, it provides support for Catharine MacKinnon’s
assertion that sexual harassment law is indeed women’s
common law; the judges on the bench at this time shaped
the contours of precedent that acknowledged the realities
of workplace discrimination.
Legal capital played an important role in the adoption of the hostile environment standard. To bolster
their decisions, adopting courts were more likely to cite
precedent on sexual harassment from other circuits.
This result echoes those of previous studies that have
found diffusion to be a process largely driven by policy
learning (Shipan and Volden 2008; Volden 2006).
Research on state courts suggests that they prefer to
delay adoption of a specific policy until their peers signal a willingness to develop or change that legal standard (Glick 1992, 1994; Glick and Hays 1991; Phillips
and Grattet 2000). It also comports well with findings
that circuits are more likely to adopt new doctrines that
have already been tacitly endorsed by at least one of
their peers (Klein 2002; Spill Solberg, Emrey, and
Haire 2006). As in most cases of policy innovation,
each institution is hesitant to be the first adopter, but
once an innovation is introduced, circuits are more

likely to become interested in shaping and molding the
new policy.
In conclusion, our findings highlight the degree to
which the “policy laboratory” concept, usually used in
the context of state policymaking, applies to the development of the law occurs in the lower federal courts. The
Supreme Court’s first intervention in sexual harassment
law came a full nine years after the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia recognized the claims of
Paulette Barnes in her suit against her employer, the
Environmental Protection Agency. The innovation of the
lower federal courts in interpreting “discrimination based
on sex” to include a hostile work environment paved the
way for a national standard that now protects men and
women in the workplace.
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Notes
1. It is worth noting that the widespread use of electronic databases (such as Westlaw) for legal research by clerks and
judges may have changed this particular mechanism for
judicial diffusion.
2. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
guidelines were merely interpretations of Title VII and not
legally binding, though appellate courts in some cases chose
to adopt their approach as controlling (e.g., Bundy v.
Jackson 641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
3. Interviews with judges have revealed that they hold different conceptions of their role (Gibson 1978; Howard 1981;
Klein 2002), which also explains the willingness of certain
judges to act as “innovators.” However, when faced with an
issue of first impression, arguably judges are more or less
forced to be innovators.
4. Early plaintiffs found attorneys from two kinds of social
networks. Family and friends were more likely to recommend a generalist attorney (without political ties to the
women’s movement), while plaintiffs who connected with
politically active attorneys or bystanders were more often
referred to attorneys who specialized in civil rights law or
that had the backing of organizations like the Women’s Legal
Defense Fund that could provide resources. Both types of
attorneys had success, however.
5. Legal capital is best defined as information gleaned from
existing legal precedent; judges may rely on this information when crafting new decisions. For a more detailed discussion, see Landes and Posner (1976) and Caldeira (1985).
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6. Our focus is exclusively on published opinions because of
their precedential weight, particularly during this time period.
7. Duration analysis, the statistical approach applied here,
accounts for elapsed time, thereby making it unnecessary to
add additional control variables for time.
8. For example, in the sexual harassment case Bundy v.
Jackson (641 F.2d 934 (D.C. Cir. 1981)), the panel cited a
Fifth Circuit case, Rogers v. EEOC, that recognized racial
harassment as a violation of Title VII (454 F.2d 234 (5th
Cir. 1971)).
9. Liberalism has been shown to be associated with greater
support with women’s rights and feminism (Bolzendahl and
Myers 2004; Mason and Lu 1988).
10. The causal mechanism underlying these effects is still not
well understood, particularly given that gender composition
of a court does not appear to affect outcomes consistently in
other potentially gender-salient areas of the law and may
vary across court settings. See Kenney (2008) for a discussion of the limitations of this research.
11. While it would be ideal to examine only first adoptions, there
are not enough observations (n = 11) to analyze these in a
systematic way. All circuits adopted the hostile environment
standard by 1989, with the first adoption occurring in 1981.
12. Some circuits had adopted the “reasonable woman” or “reasonable victim” standard, in response to criticism that the
“reasonable person” standard was too lenient and accommodating toward harassers. (For an excellent discussion of this
alternative standard, see Bartlett and Harris 1998, 509-13.)
13. Subjects that do not fail during the time period under observation are considered right censored; ordinary least squares
(OLS) cannot provide accurate estimates in this situation
because it does not distinguish between cases that are
uncensored and those that are right-censored (BoxSteffensmeier and Jones 1997). Scott and Bell (1999) also
note the advantages of survival analysis for the study of
policy diffusion, pointing out methodological difficulties
with logit models (e.g., not accounting for duration dependence) and time series models (e.g., loss of degrees of freedom and possibility of perfect prediction).
14. All models in the analysis were estimated using robust standard errors and the Breslow method for ties. Additionally, we
calculated the Schoenfeld test statistic to determine whether
the proportional hazard assumption held for the models
included here. In all models estimated, the Schoenfeld test
did confirm that the hazard rate was proportional across the
circuit-year observations (prob > chi2 = .900).
15. For a thorough discussion of multiple (or repeated) events
models, see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004), especially
158-62.
16. The authors would like to acknowledge the assistance of
Kevin Baggett at the Louisiana State University Hebert Law
Center in accessing the Westlaw database. The case list was
compared against a legal casebook on gender and the law as
a validity check (Bartlett and Harris 1998).

17. This measure is drawn from the Multi-User Database on the
U.S. Courts of Appeals (Songer 1997).
18. Because panel deliberations are closed to the public, we are
unable to observe the role that female judges had in crafting
opinions, so this measure serves as a proxy. In addition, we
do not include dummy variables for the Clarence Thomas
hearings or the issuance of EEOC guidelines because there
are not enough cases after the Thomas hearings or before the
issuance of the guidelines to provide adequate variance for
model estimation.
19. The case dispositions included in this variable were reverse,
reverse and remand, vacate and remand, and vacate. If a
decision was affirmed in part but reversed in part, it was not
included.
20. We considered using the number of attorneys as a proxy for
litigiousness, but data were not consistently available in all
states for the time period of this study.
21. We also included a dummy variable for the participation of
the EEOC as an amicus curiae. However, this variable failed
to achieve statistical significance and did not change the
results for the other independent variables, so we opted to
omit it in order to preserve degrees of freedom.
22. The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of James
Goldweber at the EEOC.
23. The order in which circuits first addressed the hostile environment standard was as follows: DC, Eleventh, Third,
Fourth, Eighth, Seventh, Sixth, Fifth, Tenth, First, Ninth, and
Second. The sequence of adoption is unrelated to the raw
number and the proportion of women judges in each circuit.
24. We report coefficients and hazard ratios for all variables.
The coefficient does not have a conventional interpretation
but is used to evaluate magnitude of statistical impact as
well as to calculate the hazard ratio. Hazard ratios above 1.0
indicate that cases meeting a particular criterion are more
likely to adopt the innovation in question. For instance, a
hazard ratio of 1.6 indicates that a circuit possessing the
variable characteristic is 60 percent more likely to adopt the
policy than other circuits, while a hazard ratio of .75 indicates that a circuit is 25 percent less likely to adopt the
policy than other circuits.
25. The EEOC participated as an amicus in only seven cases,
followed with two cases each by the Women’s Legal
Defense Fund and Equal Rights Advocates. By and large,
the counsel listed as representing female plaintiffs appeared
to be local counsel, given the location of their offices and
the fact that they did not appear in multiple cases.
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